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Absfmcl-Mobile IP Onternet Protocol) enables access to the 
Internet anywhere with one IP address, hence, providing the 
flexibility that is required by today’s growing mobile work 
force. Deploying Mobile IP introduces new security h a t s  
that if not carefully addressed can have severe consequences 
for home organizations. IPSec is a commonly used protection 
mechanism that is employed in this context. IPSec requires a 
flexible key management scheme to provide cryptographic keys 
to communicating entities. A commonly used public key based 
key management system is SKIP (Simple Key-Management for 
Internet Protocols). In this paper we consider the scenario where 
a laptop that is enabled with secure Mobile IP connection using 
SKIP, is stolen and the aim is to protect the private key stored in 
the laptop. We propose a method of protecting the private key in 
which the secret stored in the laptop cannot be used to determine 
the private key. We also introduce a method of ‘disabling’ the 
stored secret such that even when the laptop is stolen, there is 
no need for changing the private key. An important property of 
our system is that it does not add extra messages to the existing 
SKIP implementation. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile IP [l] allows a mobile node to use the same IP 
address while roaming between networks. As the user changes 
its point of attachment to the network, the data packets are 
dynamically directed to the routers that are able to deliver 
the packets to the user. Mobile IP provides the seamless 
connectivity that is required by many applications, and can 
he used to enforce IP-based access control on nodes. In 
a Mobile IP system there are three main types of entities: 
Mobile Nodes, Foreign Agents and Home Agents. A mobile 
node must register with the home agent, which will store this 
information in a routing table, called a binding table, to route 
packets to the node. 
Mobile IP may he deployed over Intranets, or over wide 
area networks and the Internet. If Mobile IP is used over 
an unprotected Intranet, data packets may pass through inse- 
cure links, where packet content might he eavesdropped or 
modified. When Mobile IP is used over wide area networks 
and the Internet, a new problem is the traversal of packets 
through the firewall. Packets require tunnelling at the mobile 
nodes and de-tunnelling at the home agent or the firewall. 
Security of these tunnels and ensuring that they are estahlished 
between authenticated parties and their contacts are authentic 
is an important security issue. To provide security in Mobile 
IP, cryptographic mechanisms such as IPSec [3], [4] are 
used. A commonly used method for providing secure keys 
is SKIP (Simple Key-Management for Internet Protocol [5]). 
An important advantage of using SKIP is that key information 
can be communicated in-line, that is as part of the IP packet. 
Under SKIP, a mobile node requires a pair of private and 
public keys. The private key is known only to the node, while 
the public key is public. A node uses its private key together 
with the public key of another node to calculate a common 
key with that node. A mobile node must be able to securely 
access its private key. One alternative is to use tamper-proof 
storage, such as a smart card, to store the key and require 
the device that implements Mobile IP to access the key 
through a secure reader. This method has the inconvenience 
and expense of requiring a reader device. Software smart 
cards [27] camouflage the key in the software and so can 
expend with the card reader at the cost of lower security. 
A commonly used alternative is to store the key information 
on the device encrypted with a key which is derived from a 
password known to the user. This allows a legitimate user who 
knows the password to access the key. However, encrypting 
the key with a secret password leaves the system open to off- 
line password attack. In this paper we consider a stolen laptop 
that implements Mobile IP and our aim is to protect user’s 
private key against this attack. We assume the laptop uses 
IPSec and SKIP, and show a method of securing SKIP private 
key such that a lost device does not compromise the key. An 
important property of our system is that the key information 
can he included in the SKIP header. 
We also show how to ‘disable’ the secret stored on the 
laptop such that, without changing the private key, the stored 
secret in the stolen laptop become of no use to the adversary. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 
11, we give an overview of Mobile IP, its security and cur- 
rent protection mechanisms. In section 111, we introduce the 
problem and show that the known solutions are inadequate. 
In section IV, we describe a solution. Section V concludes 
the paper. 
11. PRELIMINARIES 
Mobile IP [l] is a network layer protocol designed over 
the Internet Protocol (IP) to enable mobility; that is allowing 
a node to change its point of attachment to the network 
while maintaining its connection. A Mobile IP address has 
two parts: a home address that is used as the permanent 
IP address of the node, and a care-of-address that changes 
according to the mobile node location. The latter is  used for 
routing purposes. Two mobiliq agents, called home agent and 
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foreign agent, are used to establish the association between 
the mobile node and a correspondent node, which is a 
node that wants to communicate with the mobile node. The 
correspondent node can be a fixed node or a mobile node. 
The two agents are routers on the home network, and foreign 
network, respectively. 
To use the Mobile 1P outside the home network, the mobile 
node obtains a care-of-address from the network that it is 
visiting and registers this address with its home agent. A 
care-of-address can be either the 1P address of the foreign 
agent, or a temporary address assigned to the mobile node 
in the foreign network, for example through DHCP [6] or 
PPP [7]. The two care-of-addresses are called foreign agent 
and collocafed care-of-address, respectively. The home agent 
updates the care-of-address of the mobile node in its binding 
table. 
Packets from a correspondent node will be received by the 
home agent and tunnelled to the registered care-of-address, 
The foreign agent then de-tunnels packets and sends them 
to the mobile node. Tunnelling encapsulates Mobile IP’s 
packets. For example, in IP-within-IP [SI the original Mobile 
IP packet is treated as the payload, while the home agent and 
the care-of-address are used as the source and destination of 
the encapsulated packet. Route optimization [9] is provided in 
extensions of the basic protocol and allows the correspondent 
node to send packets directly to the mobile node rather than 
traversing through the home agent. This reduces the required 
bandwidth and is particularly efficient in cases that the mobile 
node is close to the correspondent node. 
Mobile IP inherits IP security problems and introduces new 
security and privacy concerns. 
A. Security Issues in Mobile IP 
We focus on security issues that are specific to Mobile 1P. 
Mobile IP can be deployed over an Intranet, or over a wide 
area network and the Internet. 
If Mobile IP is used in an Intranet environment, without 
connection to the Internet, confidentiality and authenticity 
of packets must be guaranteed. Otherwise, not only security 
of the data is lost but also integrity of connections will be 
endangered. For example, modification of registration requests 
by a malicious router, which reports its own address as 
the care-of address for the mobile node will divert traffic 
and result in all packets from a correspondent node being 
tunnelled to the malicious node, hence a denial of service 
attack. Other attacks include replay of registration requests 
by a malicious node, and stealing established sessions [2]. 
Authentication is also required in route optimization and 
without it an adversary can create fraudulent binding update 
packets to redirect the traffic. 
If Internet-wide mobility is considered, the problem of 
traversing the firewall needs to be addressed as well. Firewalls 
use Ingress Filtering [12] to filter inbound packets based 
on their source address and so will discard packets whose 
network address is the same as the home network. Packets 
sent by a mobile node when it is outside the home network 
will appear as inbound traffic with the IP address of an internal 
node and will be blocked. To overcome this problem Reverse 
Tunnelling [13] is used. Mobile nodes’ packets are sent to 
the home agent before being forwarded to the correspondent 
node. This uses a method similar to tunnelling [ l]  but in the 
reverse order. However, the firewall must be sure that the 
tunnelled packets are from legitimate node [14]. 
In genera1 Mobile IP packets although they have the IP 
address of the internal network, cannot be assumed to have 
the same level of protection as packets in the internal network, 
since the packets might come from a foreign network and 
traverse through the Internet. In all above cases cryptographic 
mechanisms are used for providing the secured packets. 
B. Security Mechanisms in Mobile IP 
Mobile IP provides authentication by including a crypto- 
graphic field in registration packets. The default authentication 
algorithm is HMAC-MDS [l]. There are 3 kinds of authenti- 
cation extensions: a mandatory extension between the mobile 
node and the home agents, and optional extensions between 
the mobile node and the foreign agent, and between the home 
agent and the foreign agent. 
lPSec is used to establish a secure connection (tunnel) 
between a remote mobile node and the internal network [U]- 
[20]. A secure connection between a mobile node and a 
home network may be through one IPSec tunnel between 
the node and the firewall, or the home agent, or two IPSec 
tunnels between the mobile node and the Foreign Agent, and 
between the mobile nodes and the home agent. IPSec requires 
a scalable key management system. The two commonly used 
standards are ISAKMP [lo] and SKIP [5]. Although the 
former is adopted by IETF as the mandatory key management 
standard (IKE [ll]), it is a session oriented protocol and 
has the overhead of establishing a session. In this paper we 
consider SKIP a protocol that bundles the key information 
into the data packet and so does not have this overhead. 
111. STOLEN LAPTOP PROBLEM 
A. Motivation 
A mobile node is typically a laptop or a handheld device, 
which can he easily stolen and so the secret key of the device 
must be carefully protected and deployed. For example, if a 
laptop connection to the home network is naively automated 
such that upon switching on the device, the authentication 
protocol is automatically executed, its confiscation by a ma- 
licious user will completely compromise the home network. 
SKIP requires the mobile node to have a pair of public and 
private keys. A common way of protecting the private key is 
to use a password to encrypt it and store the encrypted form 
on  the device. However, because the public key is known 
by everyone, an attacker can launch an off-line password 
guessing attack to find the private key. The attack can be 
described as follows. 
Let Ek()  be a symmetric key encryption algorithm used to 
encrypt the private key, and let Ilk() denote the corresponding 
decryption algorithm. k is the common key used by the two 
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algorithms such that for a message x, we have Dk(Ek(z)) = 
x. Also, let E p k ( )  and Dsk()  denote a public key encryp- 
tion algorithm using the public key pk, and a decryption 
algorithm using the private key sk, where for a message x, 
Dsk(Epk(x)) = x. In an off-line password (key) guessing 
attack, the attacker has X = Eh(&) and his aim is to find 
sk. For this, the attacker will try all possible passwords, k, one 
at a time, and for each password k,  (i) finds U = D k ( X ) ;  (ii) 
for a text x, checks x 2 DU(Epk(z)). If the equality holds, 
the attacker has found the private key; otherwise the next 
password is tried. The attack works because of the ‘verifiable 
texts’ that is generated through the decryption process. 
We assume the SKIP protocol is used for IPSec and the 
setting is similar to [17], [la]. 
B. Related work 
Perlman and Kaufman [24] proposed to download the 
private key from a protected server. Their protocol needs the 
server to he fully trusted and at least two messages to be 
exchanged. 
To reduce trust on the server and also protect against 
possible server compromise, the use of multiple servers [25], 
[26] has been proposed. The private key is divided into shares 
and each share is stored in one of the servers. The adversary 
has to compromise all servers to be able to retrieve the private 
key. The increased security is at the cost of more computation 
and communication with servers and so is unacceptable for 
many applications. 
Mackenzie and Reiter [28] proposed a method of protecting 
private keys in network enabled devices. Their system does 
not require a trusted server and has provable security. Their 
construction can be used with any public key encryption and 
signature scheme. They also proposed a second protocol that 
is specific to RSA signature and El Gama1 encryption. This 
protocol allows key disabling which is particularly useful if 
the secret key has already been downloaded onto the device 
and the only way to protect against the misuse of the key when 
the laptop is stolen, is to disable the key. The main drawback 
of their schemes is the need for additional messages. 
C. Our Contributions 
We propose an extension of SKIP to provide security 
against the compromise of the mobile device, that allows 
secure connection from outside and inside of the home net- 
work. We propose two protocols: the erternal IPSec protocol, 
which is used when the laptop is outside the home network 
and the internal IPSec protocol which is used when the 
laptop is located inside the home network (see the proposed 
solution section for more detail). The internal protocol has the 
following properties: the server does not need to be trusted; 
no initialization per user is required; and public keys are 
truly public. The last point contrasts with [27] which, while 
having similar functionalities, required the device’s public key 
to be unknown by the device. The external protocol provides 
key disabling property whilst preserving confidentiality of the 
private key even if the laptop is stolen. The main advantage of 
the proposal is that the required security does not need extra 
messages and the added security is obtained by extending the 
SKIP header. 
IV. THE SCHEME 
First we introduce notation and provide relevant hack- 
ground. 
Notations 
Let E k ( )  and Dk( )  denote encryption and decryption 
algorithms and k denote the secret key. 
Let C = E k ( M )  denote the cryptogram corresponding 
to M. We use C c & ( M )  to denote that the result 
of encryption is assigned to the variable C. Dk( )  takes a 
ciphertext C as input and outputs either a message M, if C 
i s  a valid encryption of M, or otherwise retums I, we let 
Let C,,,(), Epk() and Dsk( )  denote the key generation, 
encryption and decryption algorithms of an asymmetric en- 
cryption system, respectively. G,,,(t) takes a security pa- 
rameter l! that determines the security level of the system, 
and outputs a public and private key pair (pk,sk); that is 
(pk,sk) t Genc(t). E p k ( )  takes a public key (pk) and a 
message A t  as input and outputs the encrypted value C of M, 
that is C t Epk(M). Dak() takes a ciphertext C and a secret 
key (sk) as input and outputs either a message -M, if C is a 
valid encryption of M or rehlrns I otherwise, M c VSk(C) 
where M := {M, I}. 
Let x E R  S denote a value x, randomly takes from a set 
S. The ring of integers modulo a number n is denoted by Z,, 
and its multiplicative group, which contains only the integers 
relatively prime to n is denoted, by Z:, 
Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement 
The first practical key agreement was proposed by Diffie 
and Hellman [29]. The protocol allows two parties to establish 
a shared secret over an insecure channel without having a 
shared key in advance. The protocol is as follows. To obtain 
a common key, Alice and Bob agree on a prime p and a 
primitive element g E 2;. Each participant selects hisher 
own secret a and b, a, b E Zp-1. Then, Alice sends W, to 
Bob and Bob sends Wb to Alice via an authenticated channel, 
where W, = ga (mod p) and Wb = gb (mod p) .  Given 
W,, it is assumed to be hard to find a E Zp-l. This is known 
as the discrete logarithm assumption [31]. Finally, Alice 
computes the shared key KAB = W,” = (9’)” (mod p). 
Bob can compute the same key K A ~  = W, = 
A4 := { M ,  I}. 
(mod P ) .  
This protocol is vulnerable to a “man in the middle” 
attack [32]. To protect against this attack, the shared key must 
be authenticated. This can be achieved by incorporating public 
key cryptography [31]. 
Public-key Certificate System 
A Public-key certificate system is a system which consists 
of the components necessary to securely distribute the public 
key [23]. Examples include secure DNS [21] and X.509 
directory lookup [22]. 
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Deploying SKIP in Mobile IP 
Simple Key-Management for Internet Protocols (or SKIP, 
for short) [SI is based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Users’ 
public keys, g’,g’, are authenticated through a public key 
certificate system. SKIP does not need extra messages. Cryp- 
tographic information is included as part of the SKIP header 
and sent along with the encrypted payload. The receiver uses 
the source IP address of the received packets to determine 
the sender’s public key. SKIP allows the sender to specify 
alternative IP addresses. This is very useful for mobile nodes 
to specify their care-of-address. 
To compute a session key when the network is protected 
by the firewall, the mobile node must obtain its private key 
together with the public key of the firewall. This session key 
will be used to encrypt the shared key which will be used for 
future communication. The firewall will calculate the same 
session key in a similar way, using the mobile node’s public 
key. 
Due to space limitations, more details about SKIP and its 
deployment with Mobile IP are omitted. 
A. First Scenario: The External IPSec Connection 
The purpose of this IPSec connection is to authenticate 
packets at the firewall while preserving their confidentiality. 
A Simple but Insecure Scheme 
Let i and R denote a laptop’s private key and the user’s 
password respectively. If B c E,(i) is stored in the laptop, 
an adversary can perform an off-line dictionary attack as 
described in section 111-A. That is, the adversary randomly 
chooses a password from his dictionary list and uses it to 
decrypt B. That is, = D+(B). He can verify whether his guess 
is  correct by verifying whether g‘ = g’ (mod p), where gi 
is publicly available in the PIU directory. 
A Secure Scheme 
The basic idea of ow scheme is to divide the laptop’s 
private key into 2 parts. One part is encrypted with the user’s 
password and stored on the laptop, while the other is stored 
at the firewall. When a remote laptop is switched on, the user 
enters his password, which is used to decrypt and obtain the 
laptop’s part of the private key. Then, the laptop computes the 
session key from this value and the firewall’s public key. 
The firewall needs to be assured that the user knows 
the correct password T .  We use Schnorr’s indirect proof of 
knowledge [30] techniques to show this knowledge. After 
successful verification, the firewall computes the session key 
from its private key, its stored private key part of this laptop 
and the laptop’s public key. 
The protocol has two phases: the initialization phase and 
the key generation phase. 
1. Initialization Phase 
First, the laptop’s private key i and the user’s password ?I 
are generated. Next, the private key a is  split randomly into 
two parts, and 6, where + 6 = i (mod 4). 6 is stored at 
the firewall, and the encrypted version of p, B t E,(P), is 
- 7  
p ,  q are prime 
g E Z;, where g is a primitive element 
1. select n ER Z,, where r denotes a user’s password 
2. selecl i E R  Z, ,  where i denotes a laplop’s private key 
3. select p and 6, where p,6  ER Z,, and 0 + 6 = i 
4. wmpute: 0 - E,(@) 
Laptop slores Firewall stom 
# 6 
Pmtocol 1 : External WSee Connection: Initialization Phase 
(mod 4 )  
stored in the laptop’s hard disk. The user password R and the 
components of the private key (i, p, 6) must be erased from 
the volatile memory. This phase is illustrated in Protocol 1. 
2. Key Generation Phase 
Laptop Firewall 
Store 6 1. uer enters password ii, 
where ii E Z, 
2. select T and s, 
where T, s E R  Z, 
3. wmpule : c Dp(!) 
4. wmpute : 7 = T + 0 s  
6. obtain the firewall’s 
(mod y) 
5 . a  = ( < g 7 , 7 , s > )  
7. KMN-FW + ( ~ F w ) ~  (mod P) 
SKIP process wntinues here 
public key ~ F W  from PKI 
8. < a, SKIP header, SKIP payload > 
+ 
9. receive 8 = (< i 7 ,  i, s’ >) 
IO. obtain the laptop’s public key 
11. wmputegp = 3 ( m o d p )  
12. abort if g* # gi.<gP)8 (mad p) 
13. KMN-FW - (go)? (mod PI. 
j denotes the firewall’s private key 
14. lPSec connection starts here 
Pmtoeol 2: External WSee Connection: Key Generation Phase 
‘)i from PKI 
9 -  
First, the user needs to enter his password R so that a 
can be found. Then, the mobile node finds CY, where a t (< 
gy, T,  s >). y is computed as r+p.s (mod q), where T and s 
are random numbers. The session key is computed from and 
the firewall public key qFW. That is, KMN-FW + ( ~ F w ) ~  
(mod p ) .  where q p w  = gj (mod p). CY is sent together with 
the SKIP packet. 
The fiewall verifies the authenticity of R by incorporating 
Schnorr’s i?direct proof of knowledge as follows: the firewall 
computes go from qi /g6  (mod p), where pi is the laptop’s 
public key and qi = ga (modp), and compares if gy 2 
gi. (gB)’ (mod p) holds. 
If verification succeeds, the firewall will be convinced Of 
the user’s identify, and computes the session key using g@ 
together with its private key U). That is, K M N - ~ W  + (do)’ 
(mod p ) .  Otherwise, it will send a message to inform the user 
that authentication has failed. If the firewall receives several 
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TABLE I 
M A I N  DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL IPSEC 
CONNECTIONS 
TABLE I1 
M A I N  DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL 
PROTOCOLS 
I External WSec I Internal IPSec 




outside the organi- 
zation network 
not required 
(firewall stores 6) 
at the firewail 
fixed or mobile 
inside the argani- 
zation network 
required 
at Ule sewer 
failed requests from the same user within a short time period, 
it will suspend the connection request from the user. This is 
important to prevent the online dictionary attack. 
Key Disabling Feature 
We note that the private key i is not disclosed even though 
the system is accessed by a valid user. We can obtain a key 
disablingfunction, as defined in [28]. This allows the owner 
of the laptop to reuse the same private and public key pair 
for a new device. To disable the secret of the laptop, a Few 
breakdqwn pf the private key i ‘:toA two components (p, 6) 
where p + 6 = i (mod-qj and (p, 6) # (p, 6) will be used. 
The new components (/3,6) result in valid operations using 
the same public key gz. 
B. Second Scenario: The Internal IPSec Connection 
When the Mobile IP enabled laptop is used inside the home 
network, it can communicate with the other mobile nodes 
directly without going through the firewall. To preserve the 
confidentiality of the communication, we use secure IPSec 
communication with the same private key as in the previous 
protocol. However, we need to modify the protocol. 
When the laptop uses the external IPSec connection, it 
communicates directly with the firewall which stores 6. There- 
fore, the session key can be computed with the partial secret 
key /3 only, without the need to reveal 6. This is because 
the firewall has knowledge of 6. The situation is different 
when the laptop is used within the home network and uses 
the internal IPSec connection to communicate with another 
mobile node without going through the firewall. Since the 
other mobile node M,, does not know 6~,, it cannot 
compute the session key. Similarly, the laptop does not know 
6 ~ “ .  To solve this problem, we introduce a server with a 
function similar to the firewall for nodes inside the network. 
The server will allow each node M, to download its own 6,. 
This method is used instead of allowing the mobile node M, 
to download SI, to avoid a collusion attack between Mn 
and the adversary. Otherwise, M,’s user can reveal 61,pt, 
to the adversary, which will later enable him to perform an 
off-line attack when the laptop is stolen and taken outside the 
network. 
The differences between the external and internal IPSec 
connection are illustrated in Table I. 
Ticket 
Private key 
We allow mobile nodes to download their own 6 from 
the server and assume the server is trusted. If the server is 
untrusted, we can employ the ticket concept from [28]. That 
is a public key encryption scheme is deployed to encrypt 6 to 
form a ticket. This ticket is stored at the laptop. The public 
key of the server is used as the encrypted key. Therefore, the 
server in this scenario does not store 6, rather, it obtains 6 
from the ticket sent by the laptop using its decryption key 
We note that the private key i is revealed in the intemal 
IPSec connection, and hence we cannot reuse the key. If 
the stolen laptop is detected, both of the laptop’s public and 
private key pair must be changed before the new initialization. 
We also note that we can use the same approach used in the 
untrusted server scenario to avoid storing 6 at the firewall, by 
encrypting 6 with the firewall’s public key and store it in the 
laptop’s hard disk. 
The protocol is divided into two phases: the initialization 
phase and the key generation phase which are illustrated as 
follows. 
1. Initialization Phase 
If the server is trusted, the initialization values for the 
laptop follow the same procedure as in the external protocol. 
The additional task is to store 6 at the server as well as the 
firewall. 
If the server is untrusted, the laptop is required to store a 
ticket for 6. The ticket is computed as T~~~ t $e,.*(6). 
2. Key Generation Phase 
First, the laptop requests the server for 6. If the untrusted 
server is deployed, the laptop is required to send the ticket. 
The server needs to verify the identity of the user. If the 
verification succeeds, 6 is sent to the laptop in a secure 
form. Laptop can combine this information with its secret 
information p to find a common key with another mobile 
node. This phase is shown in Protocol 5 in the extended 
abstract. 
The main differences between the external and intemal 
protocol are listed in Table 11. 
C. Comparison of our scheme and the existing Mobile IP- 
SKIP scheme 
In the following we compare the proposed solution with the 
scheme in [17]. Both schemes use SKIP and provide secure 
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indirect p rwf  
6. Process SKIP 
operations 
in [17] uses a smart card to store the private key and requires 
smart card readers. Our scheme requires a small amount of 
storage in the laptop’s disk. 
Table 111 shows the main differences between OUT scheme 
and that of [17]. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We have given an overview of Mobile IP and its advan- 
tages, and reviewed security issues related to Mobile IP. We 
considered the case that a device that has stored the private 
key of a secure Mobile IP system is lost and protection 
must be provided against unauthorized access of the adversary 
through the stolen device. We proposed protocols that secure 
the Mobile 1P enabled laptop to be used securely inside or 
outside the home network. 
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